William Marbury received a commission to be a justice of the peace for Washington, D.C. at the end of President John Adams' term of office. In the confusion of the last day of his Presidency, the outgoing Secretary of State John Marshall did not deliver the commission paperwork to Marbury. After Thomas Jefferson became President, William Marbury asked the new Secretary of State, James Madison, for his commission. Madison refused to deliver the commission. To protest this action, Marbury went to the U.S. Supreme Court and asked them to issue a writ of mandamus. A writ of mandamus is an order from the court telling an official to perform their duties. This action would force Secretary of State James Madison to deliver the commission. Marbury believed that under the Judiciary Act of 1789 the Court could issue such a writ.

The Supreme Court ruled that, while Marbury was due his commission, the Supreme Court was not the proper court to go to. While the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the Supreme Court the power to issue such a writ, it was not a power given to the Supreme Court by Article 3 of the Constitution. As a result, Chief Justice Marshall said that the Judiciary Act 1789 was in conflict with the Constitution. Because the Constitution was supposed to be the supreme law of the land, the Supreme Court could not enforce a law that violated it. This case established the Supreme Court's power to review acts of Congress and to declare federal laws that are in conflict with the Constitution invalid. This power is referred to as judicial review.

In 1816, the United States Congress created the 2nd National Bank of the United States to provide a national currency. This action was not popular with many of the states because it caused an economic depression. As a result, many states would not let the bank operate in their states and six states, including Maryland, passed laws that placed a tax on the bank. In Baltimore, James McCulloch, a cashier with the Second Bank of the United States, refused to pay the tax. The state of Maryland sued McCulloch and won in the Maryland State Courts. McCulloch appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

In the decision, the Supreme Court found that the Constitution did not expressly give Congress the power to charter a national bank. However, Article 1, section 8, clause 18 did give the Congress the power to "make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers". This "necessary and proper" clause justified the power of the federal government to create the bank. This clause, also known as the elastic clause, expanded the powers of the federal government and gave them the power to address the needs of the nation when necessary. The Court also stated that Maryland could not tax the bank. This interpretation strengthened Congress because it meant that if an individual state was unhappy with a law passed by Congress, it could not take steps to interfere with the operation of the law within its boundaries. This case upheld the supremacy of the national government over state governments.

In 1890, the state of Louisiana passed a law that required railroads to provide "equal but separate accommodations for the white and colored races…" Passengers could only sit in the cars of the train assigned to members of their race. If they refused to sit in the assigned seats, a railroad officer could remove the passenger from the train. The passenger could also be charged with a crime for a violation of this law. In 1892, Homer Adolph Plessy sat in a white's only car on a train. When a conductor ordered Plessy to give up the seat, Plessy refused, was arrested and removed from the train. At the trial, the local magistrate found him guilty of violating state law and sentenced him to jail. On appeal, the Louisiana State Supreme Court upheld the 1890 law and Plessy's conviction. Plessy believed that the Louisiana law denied him "equal protection of the laws" guaranteed by the 14th Amendment. He appealed his case to the United States Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court ruled against Plessy. In the majority opinion, Justice Henry Brown wrote that the law was reasonable and the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause required equal facilities for the two races and not equal access to the same facility. Though the term was not used by the court, the ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson became known as the "separate but equal doctrine." It justified racial segregation in many states for almost 60 years. It was not until 1954, in the case of Brown v. Board of Education, that the Court reversed its decision in Plessy v. Ferguson

For many years cases had been litigated over whether the "separate but equal" facilities for African-Americans were truly equal. In a number of these cases, including a lawsuit against the University of Maryland School of Law, states had been forced to admit African-Americans into colleges and graduate schools. But in the early 1950s, cases from Delaware, Kansas, North Carolina and Virginia were heard disputing the legality of laws requiring segregated public schools. The Supreme Court heard these cases together as Brown v Board of Education. Thurgood Marshall, lead attorney for the plaintiffs and later a Supreme Court Justice, argued that segregated schools could never be equal and that such schools violated the Equal Protection guarantee of the 14th Amendment.

The Supreme Court overturned the decision in Plessy stating that the separate but equal doctrine had no place in the field of public education. Segregation in public schools violated the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause.

Clarence Earl Gideon was arrested in Florida and charged with burglary of a pool hall. This was a felony. Gideon asked the court to appoint an attorney to represent him since he could not afford to hire a lawyer to defend him. The court denied his request and Gideon represented himself. At the time, the law only required the state to appoint attorneys for poor defendants in death penalty cases. Gideon was convicted and sentenced to five years in prison. While in prison, Gideon appealed his guilty verdict to the United States Supreme Court. Gideon claimed that the failure of the trial court to provide him with an attorney violated the protections in the 6th and 14th Amendments.

The Supreme Court unanimously ruled in Gideon, through the 14th Amendment, that the protections of the 6th Amendment were extended to the states for all felony cases. This meant that states were required to appoint counsel for all poor defendants in felony cases. The Court reversed the decision of the Florida courts and sent the case back to the state for a new trial. At this trial, Gideon was acquitted of the charges.

Note for Teachers: This case overturned the decision in Betts v Brady [316 U.S. 455 (1942)] which stated that the 6th Amendment protections only applied to the states in cases that involved capital punishment (the death penalty) or where special circumstances like age or mental incompetence made an attorney necessary to assure a fair trial.

In 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested for kidnapping and attacking a young woman in Phoenix. After being identified in a police line-up, he was questioned for two hours. Miranda was not informed of his right to have an attorney present and confessed to the crime during the questioning. He was convicted and sentenced to prison. Miranda believed that his 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated and appealed his case to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court ruled that Miranda's right to 5th Amendment protections including protection from self-incrimination was violated. They outlined the rights that a suspect must be made aware of before being questioned and also stated that if at any time before or during the interrogation the individual indicates he wishes to remain silent, the questioning must stop.

The decision in Miranda v. Arizona was controversial when it was handed down and remains so even today. However, Dickerson v U.S. 530 U.S. 428 (2000) upheld the requirement for police to give suspects Miranda warnings. In the Dickerson opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that "Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture."

In December, 1965 three public school students in Des Moines, Iowa protested the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands in school. School officials learned of the plans and decided that anyone wearing an armband would be asked to remove it. Students refusing to remove the armband would be suspended. Although they were aware of the school policy, the students chose to wear the armbands anyway and were suspended. The parents of the students filed a complaint against school officials and sought an injunction to prevent the school from punishing students that wore armbands. The lower federal courts upheld the actions of school officials. The policy was deemed reasonable on order to prevent a disturbance at school. The students appealed their case to the United States Supreme Court on the basis that the school violated their 1st Amendment right to free speech.

The Supreme Court ruled that the wearing of armbands in protest was protected by the First Amendment. Since the students engaged in a silent, peaceful protest that did not interfere with the school's work or the right of other students to be secure or left alone, the Court concluded that the students' First Amendment rights had been violated. The Tinker v. DesMoines case established that students do have First Amendment rights that can be exercised while at school. A students' 1st Amendment right to "symbolic speech" is protected as long as it does not disrupt the educational process or violates the rights of others. In later cases involving students in public schools, such as Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser (1986) and Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (1988), the Supreme Court recognized that school officials do have the right to regulate the content of student speech in certain circumstances.

T.L.O. was a 14-year-old student at a New Jersey public high school. The school had specific rules against smoking in school buildings or on school property. A teacher found T.L.O. and another student smoking in the bathroom and sent her to the assistant principal's office. T.L.O. denied that she had been smoking and the assistant principal searched her purse. During the search, the assistant principal found a package of rolling papers, a small amount of marijuana, a pipe, a number of empty plastic bags, a large number of one-dollar bills, a list of students that owed the student money and two letters that implicated T.L.O. in marijuana dealing. The State brought delinquency charges against T.L.O. in New Jersey Juvenile Court. At the hearing, the students' attorneys claimed that the evidence could not be used because it had been found during an illegal search in violation of the student's constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizures. They argued that the Constitution required that there be probable cause and a warrant to admit any of the evidence.

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches and seizures does apply to public schools but that the warrantless search in this case by school officials was reasonable. Justice Byron White stated in the court's written opinion that school officials may search a student in school as long as there are "reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school." The New Jersey v. T.L.O case establishes with regards to the 4th Amendment, that the rights of students, while at school, are not equivalent to the rights of adults. When school officials search a student, they do not have to obtain a search warrant nor have probable cause before conducting a search, but they must have a reasonable suspicion that a school rule has been violated. This is in contrast to police, who need to demonstrate probable cause that individuals they search have violated a law.

In 1917, the United States was involved in World War I and Congress passed the Espionage Act. This law "made it illegal to encourage insubordination in the armed forces or to use the mails to distribute materials urging resistance against the government" Charles Schenck, a member of the Socialist Party of the United States, mailed 15,000 leaflets to men who were eligible for the draft. The leaflets suggested that the draft was illegal and that participation in the First World War was not in America's best interests. Schenck was arrested. He claimed that he had the right to distribute the leaflets under the protection of the 1st Amendment right to free speech. Schenck was convicted for violating the Espionage Act of 1917. He appealed his case to the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court ruled against Schenck and found that the Espionage Act did not violate the rights of free speech. This was the first time the Supreme Court faced the question of whether the government can limit free speech under special circumstances. The Court established a test for the limitations on free speech. First, it set up the "clear and present danger" test in which the government may limit the rights of free speech or free press when there is threat from spoken or written words that may "bring about substantive evils that Congress has the right to prevent." Second, the Court decided that certain speech permissible during peacetime may be punished during wartime. The Schenck case established that the right to free speech is not an absolute guarantee.

In 1919, Benjamin Gitlow published a pamphlet for the Communist Labor Party of the United States. The pamphlet urged people to overthrow the United States government. He was arrested and convicted of violating the New York's Criminal Anarchy Law. Gitlow appealed his case to the United States Supreme Court claiming that his 1st Amendment rights of free speech and free press were violated and that the 14th Amendment due process clause extended these rights.

The Supreme Court ruled that the New York Criminal Anarchy Law was constitutional and the government may punish those who threaten to overthrow the government by unlawful means. However, this case is important because it established the incorporation doctrine. In Gitlow the Court held that the 1st Amendment rights of free speech and free press could be applied to state governments through the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. This case provided a foundation for the expansion of the rights of individuals. Since this case, the incorporation doctrine has been used to apply most, but not all, of the Bill of Rights to the states.

In 1927, Jay Near wrote reported sensational stories in his publication, the Saturday Press, about ties between gangsters and local officials. One official named was county prosecutor Floyd Olson. Olson filed a complaint under the Minnesota Public Nuisance Abatement Law charging that the Saturday Press had defamed various politicians and other members of the community. The county judge issued a temporary restraining order against the Saturday Press and prohibited the publication of the paper. Near's attorney claimed that the Minnesota Public Nuisance Abatement Law was a prior restraint and therefore violated the 1st Amendment protections of free speech and press and the 14th Amendment's due process clause. A prior restraint forbids a newspaper from even publishing something that the government does not approve of.

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Near and held that the Minnesota Public Nuisance Abatement Law violated the 1st Amendment. In this case, the Court applied the 1st Amendment protection from prior restraint to the states through the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. As a result of this decision, the government cannot censor or block publication of a newspaper or magazine in advance except in exceptional circumstances.

In 1957 police officers suspected Dollree Mapp of criminal activities. The police entered her home on May 23, 1957 claiming they had a search warrant. A search warrant is required under the 4th Amendment to the Constitution in order to search someone's home. During the search, the police found obscene photos and arrested Ms. Mapp. Possession of such materials was illegal in Ohio. Dollree Mapp was convicted and sentenced to prison. She appealed her case claiming that the 4th Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches was violated.

The Supreme Court overturned Mapp's conviction. They ruled in her favor, stating that evidence obtained when the police violated her 4th Amendment rights could not be used against her. This is known as the exclusionary rule. While the exclusionary rule was created by the Supreme Court in the case Weeks v. U.S. (1914), Mapp v. Ohio (1961) held that the exclusionary rule also applied to state and local law enforcement officers.

The New York State Board of Regents [State School Board] composed a short prayer that could be read at the beginning of the school day on a voluntary basis. In New York, the New Hyde Park Board of Education required that the prayer be read by the teacher at the beginning of every school day. Parents of several students objected to this practice and believe it violated the principle of separation of church and state. They appealed their case to the U.S. Supreme Court claiming that the board's action violated the 1st Amendment ban on the establishment of religion.

The Supreme Court ruled against the Board of Regents in this case. In the opinion, the Court stated that the requirement to say this prayer violated the establishment clause of the 1st Amendment and applied to the state of New York through the 14th Amendment due process clause. The creation and distribution of a prayer by an official agency of the state government violated the protections in the 1st Amendment. This case established a strong precedent favoring the strict separation of church and state.

Charles Katz, a known gambler, was being investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for allegedly using a public telephone booth to make illegal bets. The FBI placed electronic devices outside the telephone booth Katz used regularly to monitor and record his phone calls and gather evidence of gambling activity. Based on the recordings, Katz was arrested and convicted. He appealed his case to the Supreme Court stating the evidence obtained through the electronic surveillance could not be used against him because it was obtained illegally and that the government violated his 4th Amendment right to protection against unreasonable search and seizure.

The Supreme Court ruled in Katz's favor. The decision overturned the 1928 case Olmstead v United States which permitted the federal government use of surveillance and wiretaps outside a person's home. "The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," wrote Justice Potter Stewart for the Court .The Katz case expanded the scope of the 4th Amendment to include protection against warrantless electronic surveillance and protected an individual's privacy in public places.

In 1972, the University of California at Davis selected 100 students for enrollment in the medical school. Eighty-four of the openings were filled by standard admissions procedures and the remaining sixteen spaces were filled by a special affirmative action program that increased the number of admitted disadvantaged students from minority groups. If a student sought admission through the affirmative action program, they could have lower grade point averages, and lower scores on standardized tests than those accepted through the standard admissions procedure.

Allan Bakke, a white male, wanted to become a doctor and applied to medical school in 1972. He applied for admission to the University of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected, even though his grade point average and scores on standardized tests were higher than those applicants accepted through the affirmative action program. The next year, Bakke was rejected for a second time. Bakke claimed he was a "victim of unequal and unfair treatment" and that the school's admissions programs violated the "equal protection of the laws" guarantee in the Fourteenth Amendment. Bakke appealed his case to the Supreme Court, claiming that he was excluded from admission solely based on race.

The Supreme Court was divided in its opinion in this case. The majority of the Court decided that Allan Bakke must be admitted to the University of California Medical School at Davis. The university's system of fixed quotas, which set aside spaces for applicants based on their race or ethnicity, violated the guarantee of "equal protection of the laws" in the 14th Amendment. The Court did allow admissions offices to use race or ethnicity when deciding whether to admit a person to a university program, but these factors cannot be the sole reason for admission or rejection of an applicant. The Bakke case was the first in a series of court cases that have debated the constitutionality of affirmative action programs.

Students enrolled in a high school journalism class produced a school-sponsored newspaper. Two of the pages in the newspaper referenced sensitive topics and were deleted by the principal because he determined that they contained inappropriate content. The student journalists claimed that their constitutional right to freedom of expression was violated.

The Supreme Court ruled that the student's constitutional rights were not violated in this case. School officials have the authority to regulate the content of a school newspaper because the newspaper is a part of the program of studies in the school. In writing for the Court, Justice Byron White wrote "A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic educational mission, even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school" The decision in this case reinforced the previous opinions in New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) and Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser (1986), which established that the constitutional rights of students in public schools are not the same as the rights of adults.

In 1984, Gregory Lee Johnson demonstrated outside of the Republican Party National Convention in Dallas, Texas. He burned an American Flag. He was arrested and charged with violating the flag desecration law of the State of Texas. He was convicted, sentenced to one year in prison, and fined $2,000. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals overturned the lower court's conviction of Johnson. The State appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Johnson. The Court ruled that the 1st Amendment protection of free speech includes "symbolic speech," which is an action that expresses an idea. The government could not limit Johnson's speech in this case because his actions did not cause an immediate threat to public order and safety. In writing for the majority, United States Supreme Court Justice William Brennan stated: "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable…"